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WE COULD TELL YOU, BUT THEN WE’D HAVE TO KILL
YOU: HOW INDIGENOUS CULTURAL SECRECY IMPEDES
THE PROTECTION OF NATURAL CULTURAL HERITAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES
Audrey Mense*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the past century, Western society has undergone a major shift in regards to its
treatment of native peoples and cultures. Unlike our predecessors, who often endeavored to
dominate or eradicate indigenous peoples in the Americas and elsewhere around the globe, we
now look upon these same native groups with wonder and reverence. This trend has manifested
itself in everything from the emergence of New Age medicine to a growing body of national and
international law aimed at protecting indigenous groups and cultures. This shift in the political,
social, and legal landscapes has served to re-empower many native peoples, but it has not come
without a price. For now, the danger facing these groups is not that of imminent demise, but
instead the misappropriation, and therefore cheapening, of indigenous cultures.

And

unfortunately the very laws which we have promulgated for the benefit of native peoples often
encourage further misappropriation of native knowledge, for they require that the native groups
divulge sensitive cultural information before those laws can be implemented.
This paper examines a very specific example of this legislative Catch-22, which requires
that native people choose between either governmental protection or cultural privacy. Namely, a
number of U.S. legislative enactments provide Native Americans with legal tools for protecting
their sacred sites. However, all such statutory schemes require that the interested tribe provide
documentation as to why any given site is sacred before the relevant agency can determine
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whether protection is warranted. In other words, the disclosure of sensitive tribal knowledge
precedes protection, and protection is not subsequently guaranteed.

Ultimately, this paper

proposes a framework for addressing this issue. However, before one can comprehend the
necessity of such a framework, it is important to understand how this issue has developed. In
section II, I briefly explain the international approach to cultural heritage, focusing on the
distinctions made between tangible, intangible, and natural cultural heritage in the majority of
international conventions on this topic. I then explain the manner in which these distinctions
undermine any conventions aimed at protecting cultural heritage. I subsequently explore the
various legal regimes in the United States that are aimed at protecting natural cultural heritage,
and discuss how these laws are limited in much the same way as there international counterparts.
In section III, I discuss three justifications for the guarding of cultural secrecy among indigenous
peoples: traditional norms, maintenance of social hierarchies, and the prevention of cultural
mutilation. I further discuss the defensibility of each of these concerns. In section IV, I discuss
how our view of secrecy in the United States has limited our ability to adequately address the
issue of cultural secrecy. Specifically, I address our devotion to governmental transparency in
the United States and the legal battles that have ensued when such transparency conflicts with
the native tribes’ need for cultural secrecy. Finally, in section V, I lay out a framework aimed at
addressing the concerns of both indigenous peoples and the American public in general.
II. CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW IN A NUTSHELL
Before delving into any discussion on the merits and means of protecting culture heritage,
we must first understand what the term “cultural heritage” encompasses. The task appears
daunting at first blush, because it suggests that we must first define “culture” – a term which has
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generated an enormous amount of literature but relatively little agreement. 1 Regardless of the
confusion surrounding the concept of culture, “cultural heritage” can be explained simply as
“anything that is of some cultural importance, whether it be art, literature, music, archaeological
sites, sacred artifacts, historical artifacts, natural formations, or ancient remedies.” 2

This

definition is particularly useful to the task at hand, as it recognizes the link between culture and
all that it produces, irrespective of where the boundaries of that culture may lie. 3 No definition
of “culture” is required.
Understandably, protecting cultural heritage is far more difficult than defining it. In the
past century, we have created a complex legal framework aimed at protecting cultural heritage,
consisting of a web of both national and international laws. The following subsections briefly
outline the evolution of this framework both internationally and here in the United States.
A.

Cultural Heritage Realms in International Law

In the same way that property law is divided into tangible and intangible domains,
cultural heritage can likewise be divided between the realms of tangible and intangible. 4
Tangible cultural heritage, as it suggests, consists of physical goods associated with a culture,
such as pottery, artwork or architecture. 5 In contrast, intangible cultural heritage consists of
“traditional knowledge,” which encompasses everything from music to medicinal remedies and

* Associate at McCarthy Duffy LLP. J.D., 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., 2005, University of Kansas.
Special thanks to Professor Sarah Harding for her assistance and guidance through the process of writing this article.
1
For an in depth discussion on the problems created by any attempt to define “culture,” see generally Madhavi
Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L REV. 495 (2001) (discussing how any fixing of culture within specific
boundaries serves to remove cultural dissent from the picture, thereby inaccurately reflecting true culture); Naomi
Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004 (2007) (noting that culture is not
homogeneous and does not necessarily reside in one specific group of people).
2
See Sarah K. Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 291, 297 (1999).
3
Id.
4
See Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 443-444
(2008) (discussing the evolution of tangible and intangible cultural heritage).
5
See Erin K. Slattery, Preserving the United States’ Intangible Cultural Heritage: An Evaluation of the 2003
UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage as a Means to Overcome the
Problems Posed by Intellectual Property Law, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 201, 206 (2006).
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folklore. 6 Additionally, unlike traditional property law, cultural heritage also encompasses a
third realm: that of natural heritage, which refers to geographical locations with which cultures
associate themselves such as the Dead Sea or the Grand Canyon. 7 Over the years, laws aimed at
protecting these various realms have remained significantly segregated. Indeed, legal regimes
aimed at protecting tangible and natural cultural heritage predate their intangible counterparts by
roughly thirty years.
Protections for tangible and natural cultural heritage were first realized through projects
such as the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an
Armed Conflict, which defined the protected cultural property as:
[M]ovable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of
every people, such as monuments, architecture, art or history, whether religious or
secular, archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of
historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books . . . as well as
scientific collections . . .” 8
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”)
originally employed a definition similar to the The Hague’s, recognizing tangible and natural
heritage only.

For instance, the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and

Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1970
defined cultural property as “property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically
designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature,
art or science” 9 The Convention then proceeded to list eleven categories of cultural heritage,
including collections of flora and fauna; pictures, paintings and drawings; manuscripts;
6

Id. at 207.
Id. at 205-6.
8
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 1(a), May 14,1954,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
9
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
7
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antiquities; and elements of dismembered historic or archeological sites.

Similarly, the

UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of
1972 defined natural heritage as:
[N]atural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of
such formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or
scientific point of view; geological and physiographical formations and precisely
delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and
plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or
conservation; [and] natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of
outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or
natural beauty. 10
Notably, neither the Hague nor the UNESCO Conventions made reference to cultural
knowledge or traditions. In essence, then, both organizations sought to protect the physical
manifestations of and dwelling spaces associated with any given culture while failing to protect
the actual cultures that produced those items or inhabited those spaces.
Not until the mid-1980’s did the protection of intangible cultural heritage gain
international support, 11 and not until UNESCO adopted its 1989 Recommendation on the
Safeguarding of Traditional Cultural and Folklore did an international body seriously take up this
issue. 12 In the 1989 Recommendation, UNESCO defined folklore as:
[T]he totality of tradition-based creations of a cultural community, expressed by a
group or individuals and recognized as reflecting the expectations of a community
in so far as they reflect its cultural and social identity; its standards and values are
transmitted orally, by imitation or by other means. Its forms are, among others,
language, literature, music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs,
handicrafts, architecture and other arts. 13

10

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, art. 2, Nov. 16, 1972,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114044e.pdf#page=134.
11
See Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 61, 72 (2000) (discussing the
growing trend since the mid-1980s to provide greater international recognition of intangible cultural heritage).
12
Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore, Nov. 15, 1989,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13141&URL_DO=DO_PRINTPAGE&URL_SECTION=201.html.
13
Id. at § A.

5

UNESCO then proceeded to outline a method whereby governments were to identify,
preserve, conserve, and protect all those aspects failing within this definition. 14 Just as with the
earlier Hague and UNESCO Conventions, the Recommendation limits itself to one piece of the
cultural heritage puzzle – the intangible piece. Although numerous other Conventions have been
adopted since the 1989 Recommendation, the majority tends to follow the precedent set early on
by The Hague and UNESCO in that tangible, intangible and natural heritage are viewed as three
distinct entities. And although the popularity of these distinctions may be losing ground on the
international level, as demonstrated by the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of
the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 15 this shift in focus has come slowly and, as demonstrated
below, is still all but absent in the United States.
B.

The Distinction Legal between Tangible, Intangible, and Natural Cultural Heritage
Undermines the Laws Aimed at Protection Cultural Heritage
Although the distinction between natural, tangible and intangible cultural property may

initially seem sensible to those of us steeped in Western jurisprudence, in many cases it serves to
undermine the legal schemes that embrace such distinctions. The problem is that, in reality, the
boundaries of these three types of heritage are not clearly delineated, and thus if we hope to
protect tangible/natural object X, we must also protect related intangible aspect Y, and vice
versa. 16

Richard Kurin, the Acting Under Secretary for History, Art, and Culture of the

Smithsonian Institution, has explained this phenomena as follows:
For many people, separating the tangible and the intangible seems quite artificial
and makes little sense. For example, among many local and indigenous
communities, particular land, mountains, volcanoes, caves and other tangible
14

Id. at §§ B, C, D, F.
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, art. 2(1), Oct. 17, 2003,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf. The Convention defines intangible cultural heritage as
“the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts and
cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups, and in some cases, individuals recognize as part of
their cultural heritage.”
16
See Slattery, supra note 5 at 208.
15
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physical features are endowed with intangible meanings that are thought to be
inherently tied to their physicality. Similarly, it is hard to think of the intangible
cultural heritage of Muslims on the hajj, Jews praying at the western wall of
Jerusalem’s temple, or Hindus assembling for the kumbh mela as somehow
divorced and from the physical instantiation of spirituality. 17
Many indigenous people have pointed out this shortcoming as well, indicating that, in
their view, these three types of cultural heritage are not necessarily distinguishable. 18 Thus,
because it is impossible to fully protect any of these types of cultural property without
simultaneously protecting the others, and because many native traditions fail to even recognize a
distinction between them at all, legal measures that address only one of these cultural aspects are
necessarily inadequate and may ultimately prove worthless. In the United States, numerous
statutes fall victim to this exact problem, particularly in regards to the protection of natural
cultural heritage. The following section provides a brief summary of these laws and highlights
the unintentional burden they place on Native Americans.
C.

Cultural Heritage in the United States

In the United States, a large body of statutory law protects Native Americans’ cultures
and homes.

This body of law includes the American Indian Religious Freedom Act

(“AIRFA”), 19 the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 20 the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”) 21 and the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act

17

See Richard Kurin, Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage in the 2003 UNESCO Convention: A Critical
Appraisal, 56 MUSEUM INT’L 66, 70 (2004); see also Special Rapporteur on the Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Discrimination against Indigenous People: Study on the Protection of
the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, para. 26, Comm’n on Hum. Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (July 28, 1993) (by Erica-Irene Daes) (stating that for “indigenous people, heritage is a
bundle of relationships, rather than a bundle of economic rights. The ‘object’ has no meaning outside of the
relationship, whether it is a physical object . . . or an intangible. . .”)
18
See Slattery supra note 5 at 455-456 (noting that, for many indigenous peoples, the “unseen is . . . as much a part
of reality as that which is seen – the spiritual is as much a part of reality as the material”).
19
42 U.S.C.A. 1996 (West 2010).
20
16 U.S.C.A. 470 et seq. (West 2010).
21
42 U.S.C.A. 4321 et seq. (West 2010).
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(“NAGPRA”), 22 among others. AIRFA, which was the first of statutory schemes, was designed
to combat three major issues facing Native Americans: (1) the inability of many groups to access
sacred land, (2) legal restrictions on the use of items integral to religious rites such as peyote and
eagle feathers, and (3) interference with sacred ceremonies by an overly enthusiastic public. 23
Although AIRFA ultimately proved to be a toothless statutory scheme, 24 it paved the way for
later legislation such as NAGPRA.
In contrast to AIRFA, the NHPA has proven to be a very useful tool for indigenous
peoples. The NHPA contains specific provisions for the inclusion of important indigenous sites
on the National Historic Property Registrar. 25 It provides “Indian tribes” with a means for
blocking the modification or destruction of those places they hold most sacred, provided that the
land in question is owned by the federal government. 26
Similarly, NEPA encourages federal agencies to “preserve important . . . cultural and
natural aspects of our national heritage.” 27 Under NEPA, if a proposed federal action will
“significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment,” the responsible agency must draft
a detailed environmental impact statement (“EIS”). 28

Within this category of “significant

effects” are cultural and historical impacts. 29 Thus if a federal action will affect culturally and
historically relevant sites, including Native American sites, the agency must go through the
burden of drafting an EIS.

22

25 U.S.C.A. 3001 et seq. (West 2010).
42 U.S.C.A. 1996 (West 2010).
24
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 455-456 (1988) (where the Supreme Court
discusses the inadequacies of the AIRFA).
25
See 16 U.S.C.A. §470a(a) (West 2010) (discussing the registrar).
26
This is not to say that privately owned land cannot be added to the registrar. However, private owners have the
right to object to the inclusion of their property on the federal registrar and thus indigenous groups cannot forcefully
apply the provisions of the NHPA. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470(101)(a)(6) (West 2010).
27
42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(b)(4) (West 2010).
28
42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(c) (West 2010).
29
42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(b)(4) (West 2010).
23
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Finally, NAGPRA prohibits the excavation and removal of native remains and related
artifacts on federal lands without a permit. 30 In granting such permits, the relevant agency must
first consult with the affected tribes. 31
While these statutes seem to provide ample protection for indigenous peoples within the
United States, at least the NHPA and NEPA contain a notable flaw: namely, they require the
interested native tribe to share information about the site in question before the agency can
decide whether that site qualifies for protection. This mandate creates a Catch-22 for such tribes,
because often the traditions that render any particular piece of land culturally important are
secret, and thus a tribe must pick between protecting either (1) the sacred land, or (2) the sacred
information related to that land. Such a dilemma illustrates the problem created by a legal
regime that treats tangible, intangible and natural cultural heritage as three distinct realms.
Admittedly, the existence of this Catch-22 does not necessarily indicate that such
statutory schemes are flawed, for there is only a problem if Native American tribes are justified
in maintaining secrecy in the first place.

However, as the following section discusses,

indigenous people have many valid reasons for protecting their traditions and keeping them out
of the public eye.
III. WHY THE SECRECY?
Before delving into this topic, I would like to note that I have no intention of suggesting
that native populations should not be permitted to keep secrets, or that such keeping of secrets is
somehow anathema to Western ideals. Such a statement would be contrary to the constitutional
right to privacy we hold so dear. 32 Instead, the issue of whether Native Americans should be

30

25 U.S.C.A. § 3002(c) (West 2010).
25 U.S.C.A. § 3002(c) (West 2010); 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470a(a) et seq. (West 2010).
32
The right to privacy is not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. However, our Supreme
Court has determined that such a right exists, and it is located somewhere in the emanations and penumbras of the
31
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able to withhold cultural information arises solely from the interplay between the sharing of
information and the granting of federal protection. In other words, it is a question of whether we
should allow the tribes to demand legal protection without providing any explanations as to what
is actually being protected and why. Beyond the basic constitutional freedom giving us the right
to maintain our privacy, there are three very good reasons why we should consider permitting
Native Americans to safeguard their cultural heritage: (1) respect for traditional norms, (2)
maintenance of social hierarchies, and (3) prevention of the commodification and destruction of
tradition.
A.

Traditional Norms Often Mandate Secrecy

The first and possibly most obvious reason for maintaining secrecy is that cultural norms
often dictate that information cannot be shared with those outside the culture. This is most often
the case with sacred or religious knowledge, which many cultures view as a “limited good that
cannot properly exist in several places at once.” 33 When such knowledge is disseminated among
non-members, the power of the knowledge is weakened or distorted, 34 and often the
dissemination itself is a violation of religious tenets. 35 For example, the Zuni War Gods must
remain hidden in their natural shrines if they are to protect the Zuni tribe, 36 while Brazilian Suyá
believe that terrible things will happen if their songs are sung by the wrong individuals or at the

First Amendment, or possibly in the Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
33
See Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 197, 201 (1998).
34
Id.; see also Harding, supra note 2 at 313-14 (stating that many cultures cannot not share traditional knowledge
without “a corresponding loss in power, significance, and meaning.”)
35
See Suzan Shown Harjo, Perspectives, Fact Sheet: Protection of Native American Sacred Places, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, June 22, 2002 (noting that many native religious mandate that issues surrounding that religion
cannot be revealed).
36
See Adele Merenstein, The Zuni Quest for Repatriation of the War Gods: An Alternative Basis for Claim, 17 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 589, 590 (1992).
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wrong time, 37 and Aboriginal artists believe that improper replications of their dream motifs and
patterns interfere with and offend those familiar with the dreaming. 38
While those of us in Western society may initially balk at these assertions, 39 we must
recognize that such beliefs and reasoning are not limited to indigenous populations. Consider for
instance the papal conclave, where Catholic tradition mandates that the process by which a new
pope is selected remain entirely secret. 40 Similarly, the Church of Scientology is adamant that
certain doctrinal knowledge be shared only with elite members of the faith, because they believe
that “their secrets can save the world, but that they must be doled out only to those who have
proven ready to receive them.” 41 Given that sacred and religious knowledge is treated with such
respect by Western society, it would be hypocritical on our part to reject the complaint raised by
indigenous groups that certain religious or sacred knowledge cannot be shared.
B.

Native Social Structures May Rely on Secrecy

A second reason for maintaining secrecy is that native groups are often hierarchical and
require that information be compartmentalized.

Those in power do not want important

knowledge to leave the community only to be “discovered” by the lower echelons of that
community not authorized to possess such knowledge. 42 Such justifications for secrecy have

37

See Anthony Seeger, Ethnomusicology and Music Law, in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL
APPROPRATION 52, 55-7 (Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997).
38
See Harding, supra note 2 at 308.
39
“Balk” may seem too strong of a term here, as we all like to see ourselves as enlightened and accepting of other
cultures. However, the fact remains that we all approach the unknown with prejudices and preconceived notions,
and I am willing to bet that most people would have trouble showing the same level of deference to the Zuni religion
as they do to, say, Christianity.
40
Anonymous, Choosing a pope, BBC News, Special Reports, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/world/pope/choosing/html/.
41
Wendy M. Grossman, alt.scientology.war, Wired 3.12, Dec. 1995, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.12/alt.scientology.war.html.
42
See Brown, supra note 32 at 197-198.
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been expressed by the Hobi and Taos Pueblo 43 tribes in the Southwest United States, as well as
by Australian aboriginal populations. 44
Although such a coercive use of secrecy seems anathema by Western standards – which
instead promote governmental transparency and social mobility – we should disregard these
concerns for two reasons. First, often times the hierarchy itself is an important aspect of the
native culture. As Michael Brown explained, “[s]trict compartmentalization of knowledge is
necessary to maintain the community’s religious hierarchy and ultimately the integrity of
traditional institutions, which are based on theocratic principles.” 45 In other words, the social
stratifications are integral to the culture; and if we are going to bother ourselves with protecting
the culture, it makes little sense for us to pass judgment on it at the same time.
Second, indigenous people oppressed by such societal norms have the option of
shrugging off their native traditions and entering into mainstream Western culture where, in
theory, they are granted the same rights as everyone else. 46 For these reasons, even though many
shudder at the thought of using secrecy as a means of social control, we should not summarily
condemn such a practice by indigenous groups, nor cite this phenomenon to discourage legal
reform aimed at accommodating cultural secrecy.
C.

Secrecy Allows Indigenous Peoples to Define and Maintain Their Cultures

43

See Elizabeth Brandt, On Secrecy and the Control of Knowledge: Taos Pueblo, in SECRECY: A CROSS-CULTURAL
123, 138 (Stanton K. Tefft ed., 1980) (discussing the religious hierarchy of the Taos Pueblo and the
Pueblo’s insistence on restricting the flow of knowledge to the outside world in order to prevent such knowledge
from cycling back to the general Pueblo population)
44
See Erich Kolig, Darragu – Sacred Objects in a Changing World, in POLITICS OF THE SECRET 27, 31 (Christopher
Anderson ed., 1995) (discussing the control of religious information among certain aboriginal groups, stating that
the “view of sacred objects as a device in a conspiratorial and oppressive social mechanism is neither too far-fetched
nor is it totally without empirical evidence.”)
45
See Brown, supra note 32 at 198.
46
Such freedom is arguably not available to indigenous groups located in the developing world. However, that is a
topic for another day.
PERSPECTIVE
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A third reason for cultural secrecy is that it allows native peoples to more clearly
demarcate the bounds of their culture and to control how the outside world views their traditions.
As mentioned earlier, Western society has developed an almost fervent obsession with
indigenous ways of life, and particularly indigenous religions. 47 For example, in the United
States, average citizens are turning to traditional practices such as ersatz Medicine Wheel
ceremonies, sweat lodges, vision quests, and ayahuasca-induced healing sessions as a means of
release, renewal, and rebirth (or any other number of titillating verbs contained in the New Age
literature). 48 As a result, these native traditions become part of mainstream Western culture and
the native groups from which the traditions were derived become less unique. 49 This form of
cultural piracy has become so prevalent, in fact, that the Lakota tribe has actually declared war
on the “absurd public posturing” of native traditions. 50
Further, it is not simply intangible cultural heritage that has been modified. The physical
manifestations of culture, such as artwork and textiles, are in danger as well. For example, in
Australia, there has been an outcry over the use of traditional aboriginal art for “decorating a host
of mundane products primarily developed for the tourist trade, such as tea-towels, pencil cases,
key rings,” and more. 51

Because the promulgation of indigenous traditions and products

cheapens the cultures that sired such traditions, it is understandable why many groups endeavor
to limit access to those traditions they hold most sacred.

47

See Brown, supra note 32 at 201.
See Elizabeth Sandager, Ethical Implications of the Documentary Record, 21(2) NEW ENGLAND ARCHIVISTS
NEWSL. (The New England Archivists, Mass.) 1994, at 4, 5.
49
Interestingly, claims of cultural piracy are not made solely against members of Western society. For instance, the
Hopi tribe has accused the Navajo of stealing various Hopi traditions, such as the belief in sacred colors and the
gathering of eagle feathers. An employee of the Hopi Cultural Preservation office has remarked that “we’re afraid
that if was say something, the Navajos will say that it’s theirs too.” See Michael F. Brown, WHO OWNS NATIVE
CULTURE? 19 (2003).
50
See Brown, supra note 32 at 201.
51
See Michael Blakeney, Protecting Expressions of Australian Aboriginal Folklore Under Copyright Law, 17 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 422, 422 (1995).
48
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Another concern voiced by native peoples is that of cultural distortion. As soon as a
cultural tradition or aspect enters the mainstream, it is exposed to countless mutating forces.
Thus, in much the same way that a word gets twisted out of shape in a game of “telephone,” a
tradition can be tweaked, ‘improved,’ and altered over time. For this reason, what was once an
Eastern spiritual discipline meant to cleanse the mind and tame the body is now a yoga class
down at the local gym. 52
A more concrete example of cultural appropriation occurred in 1996, when Michael
Cretu released the single “Return to Innocence.” The song featured the vocals of an Ami elder
Lifvon Guo who, as a young child, was entrusted with the task of “keeper” of the traditional Ami
folksongs. 53 Guo, who performed for the Ministries of Culture of Taiwan and France, had no
knowledge that his chants had ever been recorded or that non-Ami parties owned the rights to the
recordings. 54 When “Return to Innocence” hit the radios and topped the charts, Guo and the Ami
people had no legal recourse. 55 Instead, they simply had to watch as a piece of their culture
slipped away from them in the form of a pop song. 56 Such mangling of cultural traditions has
taught native groups that the integrity of their cultures often depends on secrecy.
Given this history of adoption, promulgation and mutilation of cultural heritage,
indigenous peoples certainly seem justified in guarding their secrets from non-members. For this
reason, it would be wise of us to actually address the issue of secrecy when creating legal

52

The question of whether distortion of cultural norms is necessarily a bad thing is not easily answered. Consider
for instance whether there is truly any harm in offering yoga classes at the local gym. Sure, the class is substantially
different from the original practice, but in its current form is offers people access to a health and fitness regime that
they wouldn’t otherwise be part of. The point I hope to make in this section is not that the distortion of cultural
heritage is regrettable, but that at least many native peoples view it as such. For a lengthier discussion on the pros
and cons of cultural distortion, see generally Brown, supra note 49.
53
See Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An Essay on Rights and
Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 159-60 (2004).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
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regimes aimed at protecting native cultures, rather than simply forcing such cultures to adapt to
our information-driven legal customs.
IV. AMERICAN HESITANCY IN REGARDS TO PROMOTING SECRECY
A.

Freedom of Information

In the United States, secrecy has long been viewed as threatening to our democratic
processes, which require governmental transparency and shared power. 57 This fear was summed
up well by Woodrow Wilson when he stated “secrecy means impropriety.” 58 Thus, in the United
States, the public domain is used as a means of preventing secrecy and curbing governmental
power; for “[i]njecting information into the public domain is the perfect antidote to government
abuses that are carried out by means of secrecy. The public domain counters secrecy with public
scrutiny.” 59
This fear of governmental abuse has manifested itself most notably in the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), which requires governmental units to disclosure information upon
request, unless that information falls within a few well demarcated exemptions. 60 This Act has
proven particularly problematic for Native Americans, for such groups must rely on the federal
agencies in order to assert their rights, and the agencies are in turn bound by the disclosure rules
of the FOIA. 61 Thus, any information provided to the agencies is potentially discoverable under
the FOIA, and no amount of bargaining can get around this reality. Although information
provided by indigenous groups arguably might be covered by the one of the FOIA exemptions,
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there is no guarantee that an agency or a Court would see things this way. 62 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has specifically rejected the possibility of reading an “Indian Trust” exception
into the Act. 63 These factors paint a bleak picture for Native Americans, and it is understandable
that some groups would prefer to withhold information and risk losing protection rather than
disclosing information and subjecting themselves to the caprice of the agencies and courts.
Given that such an emphasis is placed on the free flow of information in the United
States, it should come as no surprise that the statutory schemes designed to protect Native
Americans do not respect concerns for cultural secrecy. Instead, as discussed above, the laws
make a simple, yet problematic offer: the exchange of traditional information for federal
protection. As a result, if an indigenous group hopes to use the NHPA, NEPA, or other such
laws to its benefit, it must first be willing to provide the government with sensitive cultural
information. Understandably, this has led to conflicts between Native Tribes and the agencies
entrusted with the implantation of the NHPA, NEPA, NAGPRA, among others.
B.

U.S. Courts’ Inability to Adequately Address the Issue of Secrecy

There are relatively few instances where questions on the role of secrecy have made their
way from the federal agencies into the courts. Notwithstanding this dearth of judicial precedent,
the limited case law available sheds ample light on this problem. The first case of note is
Havasupai Tribe v. United States. 64

There, the Havasupai Tribe of Arizona challenged a

decision by the Forest Service to approve a plan for the development of a uranium mine in
Kaibab National Forest. 65 When the development of the mine was first proposed, the Forest
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Service distributed copies of the plan to any party who might be interested or affected. 66 Many
parties raised concerns, and the Forest Service determined that it needed to compile
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) to address such concerns. 67 Once again, all interest
parties were informed of the EIS and were allowed to comment on the drafts. 68 Shortly after the
completion of the EIS, the plan was approved. 69
The Havasupai Tribe subsequently brought suit, claiming that development of the mine
would interfere with various sacred sites, but they refused to provide additional details. 70 The
reasons for their secrecy centered on the belief that if uninitiated people visited the site, the visit
would “violate the universe.” 71 Ultimately, the court did not look favorably upon the plight of
the Havasupai, holding that:
[The tribe members] continuously claim that they are the only ones that
know their religion, yet the record clearly shows that they were not
forthcoming on the subject during the scoping process or the comment
period leading up to the publication of the final EIS, nor would they
identify specific sites of religious significance. The Havasupai Tribe
argues that the Forest Service did not make a sufficient effort, but the
record reflects that the plaintiffs did not respond to numerous attempts for
more specific information. 72
In this way, the court placed blame on the Havasupai tribe, rather than on the statutory
enactment which failed to address the issue of cultural secrecy.
The second case of note is Pueblo of Sandia v. United States. 73 In Pueblo of Sandia, and
pursuant to the NHPA, a Native American tribe brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the United States and a Forest Service supervisor in an attempt to prevent the
66
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modification of Las Huertas Canyon in the Cibola National Forest. 74 The primary issue was
whether the Forest Service made a reasonable and good faith effort 75 to comply with section 106
of NHPA, which required the Forest Service to “take into account the effect of [any] undertaking
on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in
the National Register.” 76 Pursuant to this provision, the Forest Service mailed letters to the local
tribes, requesting “detailed information describing the location of the sites, activities conducted
there, and the frequency of the activities.” 77 The Forest Service also requested “maps of the
sites, drawn at a scale of 1:24,000 or better, as well as documentation of the historic nature of the
property.” 78 When the tribes failed to produce the requested documentation, insisting generally
that the canyon was “of great religious and traditional importance,” the Forest Service
determined that the site was not eligible for inclusion in the National Registrar. 79 At this point,
the Pueblo of Sandia Tribe brought suit. 80
In reversing summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, 81 the Tenth Circuit held
that the mere request of information from the local tribes did not constitute a reasonable effort at
compliance with section 106. 82 The court focused on the fact that the “Forest Service should
have known that tribal customs might restrict the ready disclosure of specific information,” and
held that “the information the tribes did communicate to the agency was sufficient to require the
Forest Service to engage in further investigations, especially in light of regulations warning that
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tribes might be hesitant to divulge this type of information.” 83 The court then remanded the
matter for further proceedings. 84
Shortly after the ruling in Pueblo of Sandia, the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue in
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 85 the third and final case on point.

In

Muckleshoot, the Muckleshoot Tribe brought an action against the United States Forest Service
for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging a land exchange between the Forest Service and
a private party. 86 After the Forest Service had conducted its own research on the lands to be
exchanged, the tribe requested additional studies in order to more fully address the issue of
historic cultural sites. 87 The Forest Service declined, and instead simply asked the tribe to turn
over all information it had on the potential historic sites. 88 The tribe was either unwilling or
unable to comply, and land exchange was approved. 89 The Muckleshoot Tribe then brought suit
and, relying on Pueblo of Sandia, argued that the Forest Service’s actions did not constitute a
reasonable and good faith effort to comply with the NHPA. 90 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
stating that:
[T]he record shows that the Forest Service resisted the Tribe’s requests for a
formal study of cultural properties because it would impede the finalization of the
Exchange. Given more time or a more thorough exploration, the Forest Service
might have discovered more eligible sites. However, the record also shows that
the Tribe had many opportunities to reveal more information to the Forest
Service. Although the Forest Service could have been more sensitive to the needs
of the Tribe, we are unable to conclude that the Forest Service failed to make a
reasonable and good faith effort to identify historic properties. 91
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Thus the Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed the contention in Pueblo of Sandia that in
order to be a “reasonable” effort, that effort must take into account and comport with the needs
and cultural standards of the affected tribes.
These cases demonstrate the problems facing any Native American effort to solicit
government protection for their sacred lands pursuant to any of the relevant statutory schemes.
Additionally, despite the suggestion in Pueblo of Sandia that agencies should be concerned about
the issue of cultural secrecy, the court did not articulate a manner in which to address this issue
going forward. Therefore, if a court were to look at a similar problem today, it would see that
two of the three cases hold that cultural secrecy is not to be accommodated, and that these two
cases provide a clearer analytic route to resolving the problem.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
While there is much literature on the manner in which Western societies should protect
sensitive traditional knowledge, relatively little has been written about this issue as it relates to
the statutory protection of land.

Moreover, as discussed above, the few courts that have

addressed the interplay between the protection of land and the maintenance of cultural
knowledge have either (1) disregarded entirely the importance of secret knowledge, or (2)
encouraged deference to such knowledge without providing a framework for the agencies that
must ultimately address these issues. For this reason, it is paramount that a more reliable agency
process be established. The following framework is an attempt at just that.
A.

Framework for Addressing Cultural Secrecy as it Relates to Land

First and foremost, Congress needs to either explicitly create an FOIA exemption for
sacred-site information provided by native groups in the context of tribal-agency consultations
under any federal scheme, or Congress should amend both the NHPA and NEPA so as to exempt
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any information provided thereunder by native groups from disclosure under the FOIA.92
Without this initial step, analysis beyond this point is moot, as any attempt to improve the
process would be met by FOIA obstacles.
Second, indigenous groups should compile lists describing the land which they deem
particularly sacred, the protection of which is integral to their cultures. 93 These lists should not
be made public knowledge. Rather, the lists should be deposited with the interested federal
agencies, and they should remain sealed until a dispute arises. Additionally, these lists need not
include any details as to why a particular site is culturally important. 94
Third, once the lists are complete, if any native group seeks to protect land under the
NHPA, but cannot divulge their reasons for such action, the relevant agency should look to the
lists. If the land is indeed included, then there would be a strong presumption that the group’s
claim is valid and it would shift the burden to the agency or any interested third party to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the claim is invalid. The agency can meet this burden by
providing anthropological work that suggests the claim is false, competing testimony from those
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with the indigenous community, and any other factual evidence that tends to negate the
community’s claim.
Fourth, if the land is not included on the list, or if an agency or third party intends to fight
the claim, the agency must explain to the indigenous group that they may lose the land if they
don’t provide an explanation as to why the land is culturally meaningful. At this point, the
interested agency and the members of the community should determine the circumstances under
which the group would be willing to divulge information about the sacred site. For instance, the
tribe might require that only a certain type of person can review the information, such as
occurred in the famous Australian case of Chapman v. Tickner 95 where secret knowledge could
be provided to women only. Regardless of the circumstances, it must be abundantly clear that
the agency is willing to work with the indigenous group and address their concerns, but that
complete silence on the part of that group will likely result in an unfavorable outcome. 96
Fifth, once the agency and the native group have agreed on which individuals will have
access to the information and to what extent the information can be shared, those limited
members should resolve the dispute based on 1) the presence or absence of the land on the initial
list, 2) the evidence provided by the party opposing the indigenous group, and 3) the cultural
information subsequently divulged by the native population. Beyond this point, the process
should be dictated by the general rules of administrative law. However, assuming a matter is
95
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appealed to the Courts, the affected tribe should have the option of limiting the record to exclude
that information which the affected tribe deems most sensitive.
B.

Benefits of the Framework

While this proposed method is by no means perfect, it is a vast improvement over the
current state of affairs for a few reasons. First, this method provides federal agencies with a
balanced means by which to determine such sensitive claims. This is particularly important
given the highly deferential standard under which agency decisions are to be reviewed, because
when a decision is extremely difficult to overturn, we want to make sure that decision is well
informed. 97
Second, it provides the parties with a clear method they should pursue in order to
succeed, and it also allows them to determine the likelihood of success. One of the primary
goals of our legal system is to provide stability and to guarantee that like cases are treated alike.
However, when there are various statutory schemes in place to deal with the same issue, and
when every single one of those schemes fails to address a basic problem that is tied to that issue,
Native Americans have little indication as to whether an agency or legal proceeding is even
worth pursuing.

This is further complicated by the unclear judicial precedent which, as

discussed above, fails to establish how these issues should be reviewed when they make it to the
courts. A framework which clearly delineates each party’s burden and which clarifies what
information must be taken into account will significantly reduce these shortcomings.
And finally, this method helps to establish a far more detailed factual record for the
judicial bodies who are often the ultimate arbiters of such disputes. In the three cases we have
looked at, the court had little or no factual evidence from the affected tribe; and such a dearth of
97
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information appears to have irked the courts rather than convinced them of the validity of the
tribes’ claims. Under this framework, the courts will have a much larger record to review and
the hope is that their decisions will no longer be affected by indigenous tribes’ hesitation to share
information with the agencies and the court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Western society stands at a crossroads.

We have come to realize the error of our

colonizing ways and we are now attempting to redress the many wrongs that we have wrought in
past centuries. However, despite a plethora of national and international law on the subject, there
is still no consensus on how we can best protect cultural heritage, or even whether our attempts
are merely a more subtle form of control and domination. Regardless of these uncertainties, it
appears that our determination to protect cultural heritage is here to stay.
Although there are much larger and arguably far more pressing concerns resulting from
this trend, I have chosen to address a single, limited question: How should governmental
agencies and judicial bodies in the United States address the issue of cultural secrecy, when that
secrecy interferes with legislation aimed at protecting the natural cultural heritage of the very
tribe that refuses to speak? The framework I have provided, which seeks to balance concerns
over privacy with the need for disclosure, is one such attempt. Although admittedly not perfect,
the framework is superior to the current state of affairs, which wholly fails to address the issue of
cultural secrecy. Obviously no single law or convention will remedy the shortcomings of our
current cultural heritage legal system. However, with small steps in the right direction, we can
hopefully arrive at a point where, at the very least, our good intentions are not undone by our
failure to account for intangible heritage and cultural secrecy. The framework I have proposed is
just that: one small step.
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